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INCENTIVIZING INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS TO
SERVE AS LEAD PLAINTIFFS IN SECURITIES
FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS
Charles Silver* and Sam Dinkin**
INTRODUCTION
Congress's efforts to enlist institutional investors-pension funds,
mutual funds, banks, and insurance companies-as lead plaintiffs in
securities fraud lawsuits have partly succeeded. Since the enactment
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the PSLRA),
pension funds for public sector employees and labor unions have
often volunteered for the role. Private institutional investors, how-
ever, have been less active.2 Scholars have also questioned the mo-
tives of public and union funds, contending that activist ideologies and
political contributions from attorneys have exerted inappropriate
force. 3
* Roy W. and Eugenia C. McDonald Endowed Chair in Civil Procedure and Co-Director,
Center on Lawyers, Civil Justice & the Media, School of Law, University of Texas at Austin.
M.A., Political Science, University of Chicago, 1982; J.D., Yale Law School, 1987.
** Chief Economist, Optimal Auctions, Inc., Austin, Texas, Ph. D., Economics, University of
Arizona, 1996. We are grateful for comments from Adam T. Savett.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.); 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2000); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4
(2000).
2. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas with Dana Kiku, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An
Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1609
(2006) (studying 260 post-PSLRA cases and finding no instance "where a bank, mutual fund, or
insurance company ha[d] served as a lead plaintiff in a securities class action"). But see infra
note 20 (listing cases where private institutions served as lead plaintiffs).
3. Commentators contend that political contributions are unethical, undermine the public's
confidence in the legal profession, corrupt governments, encourage the selection of inferior
counsel, lend an appearance of impropriety to fee setting, erect barriers that discourage new
lawyers from entering the field, discourage monitoring by making lead plaintiffs dependent on
class counsel, and sacrifice the interests of small investors. See, e.g., Brian C. Buescher, ABA
Model Rule 7.6: The ABA Pleases the SEC, But Does Not Solve Pay to Play, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 139 (2000); John C. Coffee. Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (2003): Samantha M. Cohen, Note, "Paying-to-Play" Is the New Rule of the
Game: A Practical Implication of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 1999 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1331; Malcolm A. Heinicke, Note, The ABA Should Not Delay on Pay-to-Play:
Regulating the Political Contributions of Lawyers to Government Officials Who Award Legal
Contracts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1523 (1997); Neil Weinberg & Daniel Fisher, The Class Action In-
dustrial Complex, FORBES, Sept. 20, 2004, at 150. Problems associated with partisan trustees of
public sector investment funds are set out in David Hess, Protecting and Politicizing Public Pen-
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The passivity of private sector funds and the importance of special
motivations for public and union funds have a common source: the
microeconomic incentives created by the PSLRA, which saddles lead
plaintiffs with exceptional costs and risks, but prohibits offsetting bo-
nus payments. The PSLRA thus makes it economically irrational for
class members to volunteer as lead plaintiffs, absent special motiva-
tions. Because private institutional investors care only about their
bottom lines, they prefer to sit on the sidelines. Because trustees for
public sector and union pension funds sometimes care about other
things, such as improving corporate accountability and encouraging
plaintiffs' attorneys to make political contributions, they volunteer
more often.
To encourage private institutions to step forward, Congress should
add selective incentives to the PSLRA. Selective incentives are emol-
uments that only lead plaintiffs can receive. This Article sets out
three proposals Congress might use. One would give lead plaintiffs
bonuses tied to the size of their holdings. Under this proposal, courts
would give larger investors larger bonuses, creating stronger incen-
tives for them to step forward. The second proposal would sell a size-
able fraction of the class-wide recovery-20%-to the class member
willing to pay the most for it and would require the lead plaintiff to
defray a disproportionate share-50%-of a class's attorneys' fee
payment. This proposal would put a plaintiff with a sizeable stake at
the head of every class, use competitive bidding to reduce the cost of
the selective incentive, and encourage the winning bidder to set fees
reasonably. The third proposal would also sell a fraction of the recov-
ery to the class member willing to pay the most for it, but the fraction
would be larger-30%-and the lead plaintiff would pay the entire
class's attorneys' fee from this portion. Compared with the first two
proposals, this proposal would eliminate the burden on judges by
transferring the responsibility for fees to lead plaintiffs and incentiviz-
ing them to pay efficient rates.
These proposals have one common feature: all would reward insti-
tutional investors for serving as lead plaintiffs by giving them dispro-
portionately large shares of class action recoveries. The proposals
would thereby create healthy competition for the lead plaintiff role.
Unlike political contributions, which are only made to or on behalf of
trustees of public sector and union pension funds, these proposals
would motivate the managers of all types of funds. They would also
sion Fund Assets: Empirical Evidence on the Effects of Governance Structures and Practices, 39
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 187, 195-200 (2005).
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harmonize the interests of managers and beneficiaries by compensat-
ing investment funds rather than those who run them. Finally, all
three proposals would reduce concerns about the impact political con-
tributions may have on the quality of representation absent class
members receive or the fees lead plaintiffs agree to pay. They would
accomplish this by weakening the incentive to make political contribu-
tions and eliminating the need for private money to create special in-
centives for managers to volunteer their funds.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II describes the legal struc-
ture embodied in the PSLRA.4 Part III shows how the PSLRA dis-
courages institutional investors from serving as lead plaintiffs by
enmeshing them in a collective action problem. 5 Part IV describes the
pay-to-play phenomenon and explains how it sometimes solves the
collective action problem by giving public sector trustees selective in-
centives to offer their funds as lead plaintiffs. 6 Part V sets out this
Article's proposal and demonstrates its superiority to pay to play.7
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
Congress enacted the PSLRA in 1995, overriding President Clin-
ton's veto. The statute implemented many reforms, some of which
Congress designed to improve the conduct of private litigation.8 The
PSLRA's lead plaintiff provision was one such reform. It created a
presumption that the class member with the largest financial stake in
the lawsuit was the "most adequate plaintiff" to occupy the lead plain-
tiff role.9
The lead plaintiff provision responded to the perception that securi-
ties class actions were "lawyer-driven" by seeking to foster greater
4. See infra notes 8-18 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 19-27 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 28-78 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 79-118 and accompanying text.
8. Other provisions were designed to protect issuers from liability. Judging from the declining
number of securities fraud lawsuits and falling recoveries per dollar of estimated loss, some have
argued that these provisions have been effective. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 2, at 1592
(noting that "[o]ne possible interpretation of [the statistically significant decline in the ratio of
settlement amounts to estimated provable losses] is that Congress should repeal [the] PSLRA in
its entirety if it wishes to help defrauded investors"). See also CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SE-
CURITIES CLASS ACTION CASE FILINGS, 2007 MID-YEAR ASSESSMENT, http://securities.stanford.
edu/clearinghouse-research/2007_YIR/20070710-01.pdf (chronicling the decline in securities
class action filings). This interpretation is disputed, however. See Press Release, Stanford Law
School and Cornerstone Research Release Mid-Year Securities Fraud Class Action Filings Re-
port (July 10, 2007), available at http://home.businesswire.com/porta/site/google/index.jsp?ndm
Viewld=news-view&newsld=20070710005784&newsLang=en (identifying lower fraud rates and
a strong stock market as likely causes of declining securities fraud filings).
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1 (2000).
473
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client control.10 Several factors contributed to the attorneys' primacy
under the prior regime. Chief among them was the race to the court-
house, the winner of which would typically gain appointment as class
counsel and receive most of the fees. Given this race, lawyers did not
wait for clients to find them when likely frauds appeared. They had to
submit complaints on the heels of sharp declines in stock prices and
adverse news reports. To do so, lawyers needed cooperative clients
who would lend their names to lawsuits immediately.
Class action lawyers may have also preferred unsophisticated
named plaintiffs with small holdings for other reasons." Sophisti-
cated clients with sizeable stakes might have been less malleable and
more independent. They may have cared more about the quality of
the legal services they received, monitored lawyers more closely, sec-
ond-guessed lawyers' recommendations, sought outside opinions, crit-
icized poor performance, and even discharged attorneys who
performed poorly. Larger clients also might have been more con-
cerned about lawyers' fees. Lesser attorneys would have disfavored
such clients. Even superior attorneys might have wondered why they
should tie themselves to such clients unnecessarily.
By enacting the PSLRA and, in particular, its lead plaintiff provi-
sion, Congress sought to replace figurehead named plaintiffs with in-
stitutional investors. The idea, explored in a famous article by
Professors Weiss and Beckerman, was that investors with large hold-
ings and, consequently, large financial interests in the outcome of class
litigation would select good lawyers, bargain hard over fees, and ac-
tively monitor the conduct of litigation, producing spillover benefits
for all defrauded investors.' 2 "The Congress clearly envisioned that
various financial institutions-pension funds, insurance companies,
and mutual funds-were the most likely types of investors who could
combine a large financial stake in the suit's outcome with the sophisti-
cation to guide the suit to an appropriate result. '13
10. Geoffrey P. Miller, Payment of Expenses in Securities Class Actions: Ethical Dilemmas,
Class Counsel, and Congressional Intent, 22 REv. LITIG. 557, 593 (2003).
11. The government has accused lawyers at Milberg Weiss, once the country's leading securi-
ties class action firm for plaintiffs, of paying illegal kickbacks to individual clients, and the firm
itself has been indicted. Mike Mclntire, Accused Law Firm Continues Giving to Democrats,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2007, at Al. Several lawyers and clients have entered guilty pleas. Associ-
ated Press, Another Guilty Plea in Milberg Weiss Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2007. From a strictly
economic perspective, the alleged payments provided supplemental incentives that ensured the
clients' availability and cooperation.
12. Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institu-
tional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053, 2112
(1995).
13. Cox & Thomas, supra note 2, at 1588-89.
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To increase the likelihood that institutional investors would appear
in securities class actions, the PSLRA added a notice procedure to the
race to the courthouse. After filing a complaint, a would-be lead
plaintiff must publish a notice in a "widely circulated national busi-
ness-oriented publication or wire service, ' 14 informing other class
members of the existence of the action and the possibility of interven-
ing. Other investors can then apply for the lead plaintiff role. When
the application deadline passes, the trial judge "appoints as lead plain-
tiff the member or members of the purported plaintiff class that the
court determines to be 'most capable of adequately representing the
interests of class members."' 15 The investor or group of investors with
the "largest financial interest in the relief sought" is statutorily pre-
sumed to be the most adequate plaintiff and is normally appointed. 16
The lead plaintiff role carries certain responsibilities. For example,
the lead plaintiff must demonstrate familiarity with the litigation and
select and retain class counsel.1 7 Under recent precedents, the latter
responsibility includes setting class counsel's compensation terms.18
Finally, a lead plaintiff must agree to accept no more than a pro rata
share of damages, plus expense reimbursements. This seemingly in-
nocuous requirement has undermined the PSLRA by discouraging in-
stitutional investors from taking the lead in securities fraud cases.
III. PARTICIPATION RATES
The PSLRA only partly succeeded in encouraging institutional in-
vestors to appear as lead plaintiffs. 19 Today, as before, individual in-
vestors control many securities fraud cases. Among institutional
investors, retirement funds for public and union employees actively
offer themselves as lead plaintiffs. Private institutional investors ap-
pear less frequently.20 Taking participation by private institutional in-
14. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(A)(i) (2000).
15. Miller, supra note 10, at 594-95 (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(a)(3)(B)(i),
78u-4(a)(3)(B)(i) (2000)).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2000).
17. See In re Microstrategy, Inc. Sec. Litig., 150 F. Supp. 2d 896 (E.D. Va. 2001).
18. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 404 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2005).
19. For a review of institutional investors' participation as lead plaintiffs, see Stephen J. Choi
& Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade
After the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1503-07 (2006). See also Stephen J. Choi et al., Do
Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869 (2005) (reporting that institutional investors rarely served as
lead plaintiffs in the years immediately following the PSLRA's enactment).
20. Adam T. Savett, who maintains the Securities Litigation Watch blog for Institutional
Shareholder Services, contends that private institutional investors serve as lead plaintiffs more
often than academics perceive. See Risk Metrics Group, Sec. Litig. Watch, http://slw.issproxy.
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vestors as the measure of success, the PSLRA has not fulfilled its
sponsors' expectations. 21
Various sources have examined the participation levels of private
institutional investors. 22 Some studies, the most notable being Price-
waterhouseCoopers's (PWC) annual reports on securities lawsuits,
found positive levels of participation. 23 Unfortunately, the PWC re-
ports are unclear. They neither list lead plaintiffs nor explain how
they categorize them. The 2003 PWC report also seems implausible.
It implies that private sector funds served as lead plaintiffs in 53 of the
218 new securities class actions filed in 2002.24 This level of participa-
tion, which would put private institutions almost on par with public
sector and union pension funds, would imply that informed observers
of securities class actions missed a hugely important development in
the field.
The 2004 PWC report also undercuts the report issued the prior
year. It contains the figures reproduced below, according to which
private institutions led only 13% of the class actions filed in 2003-
about 28 cases. 25 Even this number seems high in light of commenta-
tors' remarks. The 2004 report also indicates that private institutions
again led 13% of newly filed securities class actions in 2004, thus find-
ing no growth from one year to the next.26 Over the same period, the
frequency with which union and public sector funds appeared as lead
com/lead-plaintiff leadcounsel/; and http://slw.issproxy.com/2007/03/the-quixotic-quest-con-
tinues.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2007). He has posted fifteen cases on this subject. Adam T.
Savett Blog, Lies, Damn Lies, & Forward Looking Statements, http://liesdamnlies.blogspot.com/
2006/03/mutual-funds-as-lead-plaintiffs.html: http://liesdamnlies.blogspot.com/2006/03/mutual-
funds-as-lead-plaintiffs-part.html; http://liesdamnlies.blogspot.com/2006/03/mutual-funds-as-
lead-plaintiffs-part_31.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2007). We are grateful to him for bringing these
cases to our attention. But cf. Choi & Thompson, supra note 19, at 1504 ("There has been a
substantial increase in participation of public pension firms .... At the same time, there has not
been substantial involvement by private institutional investors, such as mutual funds, banks, and
insurance companies.").
21. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: A Gentle Critique of the Third Circuit Task
Force Report, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 805, 806 n.7 (2001) (observing that few institutional investors
have served as lead plaintiffs).
22. For a discussion, see Michael A. Perino, Institutional Activism Through Litigation: An
Empirical Analysis of Public Pension Fund Participation in Securities Class Actions (St. John's
Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-0055, Oct. 2006).
23. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
24. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2003 SECURITIEs LITIGATION STUDY (2004). The 2003
PWC Report states that "[in 2002 institutional investors and public investment or pension funds
comprised 51 percent of the lead plaintiffs for all [218] cases filed." Id. at 6. This totals 111
cases. Then, the following appears: "by 2002, union/public pension funds were lead plaintiffs in
58 out of the 218 cases filed (27 percent) .... " Id. By simple subtraction, it follows that private
sector funds must have taken the lead fifty-three times.
25. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2004 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 15 (2005).
26. Id.
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plaintiffs rose from 28% to 34%,27 supporting the claim that these
funds have become more active and have displaced individual inves-
tors. Individuals led almost half of the cases filed in 2003, but only
35% of those filed in 2004.
Lead plaintiff in securities class Lead plaintiff in securities class
action cases filed in 2003' action cases filed in 2004 14
10% 8
49% (!%
U Union & Public pension fund El Private investor
El Institutional investor 2  El N/A 3
1 Excludes "Analyst," and "Fund" cases
2 Excludes public pension funds.
3 Includes cases that have been consolidated or dismissed before a lead plaintiff was determined,
and others where lead plaintiff could not be determined.
42004 data is not fully available to date; therefore full-year projections are based on mid-year results.
Source: PRICEWATERCOOPERS LLP, 2004 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 15 (2005).
IV. INVESTORS' INCENTIVES
The preceding discussion showed that different types of investors
occupy the lead plaintiff position at different rates. Individuals par-
ticipate as often as public and union pension funds, but, if the existing
trends continue, will soon be overtaken by them. Private institutional
investors lead class actions less often and seem unlikely to become
substantially more active.
To explain these findings, one must understand that all named
plaintiffs bear costs. For example, they hire counsel, monitor counsel,
and respond to discovery requests. To make these costs worthwhile,
named plaintiffs must expect to receive offsetting benefits. Economi-
cally rational persons sue only when they expect litigation to be
profitable.
In class actions, the possibility of free-riding discourages potential
lead plaintiffs from stepping forward. In an ordinary lawsuit, an in-
27. Id.
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jured person can obtain a benefit only by becoming a cost-bearing
party. In a class action, a victim can share in the recovery while doing
almost nothing. For example, in a securities class action, an unnamed
investor can simply wait for a settlement and file a claim. Most of the
money paid out in class action settlements goes to investors who do
just that.
The ability to share in a recovery without helping to produce it cre-
ates a classic collective action problem. Rather than bear the costs
and risks the lead plaintiff role entails, the rational strategy is to wait
for someone else with different motivations to sue and subsequently
enjoy the benefit if and when it is produced. This free-riding is the
dominant strategy as long as one can be reasonably confident that
someone else will sue. In securities class actions, this is extremely
likely. Plaintiffs' attorneys watch the stock market vigilantly, hoping
to spot lucrative litigation opportunities.
Even if an institutional investor were confident that no one else
would step forward, an incentive to file a class action would not neces-
sarily arise. Individual lawsuits are cheaper than class actions, which
entail expensive procedures like certification hearings, notice, inter-
locutory appellate review, and judicial approval of settlements and
fees. Class actions can also water down institutional investors' claims
by mixing them with individual investors' weaker claims. For this rea-
son, large investors sometimes opt out of class actions and sue on their
own. 28 Given the alternatives, an institutional investor's equilibrium
strategy is to free-ride on a class action led by another investor or to
file a conventional lawsuit.
This brief description of the incentives that prevail in class actions is
incomplete. Most obviously, it fails to explain why plaintiffs file be-
tween one hundred and two hundred securities class actions per
year.29 For individual investors, a combination of entrepreneurial
lawyering and small selective incentives provide the spark. Using con-
tingent fee agreements, entrepreneurial lawyers transfer to themselves
the largest possible share of the costs associated with the lead plaintiff
28. John C. Coffee, Jr., Nobody Asked Me, But .. N.Y. L.J., Jan. 18, 2007, at 1 ("Increas-
ingly, institutional investors have been opting out of federal class actions to sue individually or in
small groups in state court."); Cox & Thomas, supra note 2, at 1604 ("Institutional investors with
large potential claims have sometimes found it more advantageous to act for themselves rather
than on behalf of all other investors."); Jay W. Eisenhofer, Institutional Investors as Trend-Setters
in Post-PSLRA Securities Litigation, in CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 2006: PROSECUTION AND
DEFENSE STRATEGIES 579, 590-93 (Practising L. Inst. 2006) (discussing the pros and cons of
opting out of class actions as a strategy for institutional investors).
29. See Stanford Law Sch., Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, Class Action Fil-
ings Index, http://securities.stanford.edu/litigation-activity.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2007).
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role. They bear all costs associated with attorney time, discovery, and
expert witnesses, in exchange for a share-historically 25% to 35%-
of any common fund recovered by the class. Bonus payments negoti-
ated in settlements then cover lead plaintiffs' remaining costs, such as
time spent attending depositions, responding to interrogatories, and
reviewing pleadings. These bonuses are small in absolute dollar terms
and as fractions of classes' recoveries. Nevertheless, the bonuses pro-
vide significant incentives, because they are generous when compared
with individual plaintiffs' actual costs.
Contingent fees and settlement bonuses produce a combination of
weak incentives for individual lead plaintiffs and strong incentives for
their attorneys, who usually hold the largest stakes in the class-wide
recovery. Predictably, these incentives lead to lawyer-driven litiga-
tion. As the largest stakeholder, the class action attorney identifies
the opportunity for litigation, confects the lawsuit, races to the court-
house, and takes the lead in other ways. The lead plaintiff, with a
much smaller stake in the outcome, goes along for the ride, a con-
tented passenger who does not wish to drive.
The PSLRA reflected Congress's opposition to lawyer-driven litiga-
tion. Seeking to replace passive named plaintiffs with active ones,
Congress enacted the lead plaintiff provision, which replaced the com-
petition over speed with a competition over size. The race that for-
merly went to the first lawyer to reach the courthouse now goes to the
lawyer able to secure the blessing of the client with the biggest loss.
The incentive for lawyers to recruit institutional investors is obvious:
by lining up the institution with the largest financial stake, a lawyer
gained control of the case and the opportunity to earn a fee. The
PSLRA's catch phrase might be "size matters."
The incentive for institutional investors to respond favorably to
plaintiffs' attorneys' overtures was not as obvious, however.30 First,
many institutions depend on public companies for business: "[b]anks,
mutual funds, and insurance companies-three of the five largest clas-
ses of financial institutions-are each vendors of financial services and
products. Their customers include the corporations and accounting
firms who are the grist of securities class actions."'31 By becoming lead
plaintiffs in securities class actions, private institutions could jeopard-
ize their relationships with important customers. Second, institutional
investors have historically been reluctant participants in securities
30. See Choi & Thompson, supra note 19, at 1504-05 (describing the free-rider problem and
institutional investors' other disincentives to participation).
31. Cox & Thomas, supra note 2, at 1609.
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fraud lawsuits. Most lack litigation departments; 32 many even fail to
claim payments when class actions settle.33
Finally, institutional investors have never been on close terms with
class action attorneys. Returns from litigation ordinarily have little
impact on their bottom lines, which depend overwhelmingly on the
performance of securities and, therefore, on access to corporate boar-
drooms and analysts. By suing for fraud, institutional investors risk
alienating those constituencies:
Consorting with "class action lawyers" does not win one friends in
the executive suites of America or at the club. Furthermore, there
is only the thinnest social divide between executives of banks, insur-
ance companies, and mutual funds and executives of industrial
firms. These are groups of individuals who understand one another
and who are aware of the price to be incurred by failing to honor
that understanding. 34
The divide between friends and enemies forces institutional investors
to pick sides. Naturally, they align themselves with the business
world, of which they are a part.
The bonuses that entice individual investors to volunteer as lead
plaintiffs are far too small to attract institutions. To convince institu-
tional investors to enter the game, Congress needed to create selective
incentives. Instead, Congress did the opposite. 35 It entrenched the
rationality of free-riding by limiting a lead plaintiff's recovery to the
same amount per share as other class members. 36 It also made no
provision for bonus payments, entitling class representatives to re-
cover only their actual costs and requiring them to forswear other pay-
ments. These arrangements made it unprofitable for institutions to
participate. As Cox and Thomas wrote, "the costs of initiating and
32. Perino, supra note 22, at 7 ("Many institutions have relatively small legal staffs that would
have difficulty conducting in-depth investigations of the potential merits of cases in which they
were considering seeking lead plaintiff status.").
33. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do Institutional Inves-
tors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 855, 879 (2002). This
omission has spawned shareholder litigation. Institutional Shareholder Servs., The Fiduciary
Duty to File Claims In Securities Class Action Settlements (Jan. 2005) (reporting that shareholder
class actions were brought against forty mutual fund managers, alleging that the managers
breached their fiduciary duties by failing to collect as much as $2 billion in settlement payouts).
34. Cox & Thomas, supra note 2, at 1609-10.
35. Congress often embraces the Pollyannaish belief, popularized in the movie Field of
Dreams, that "if you build it, they will come." See David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor
State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.: Is Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of
the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893, 988 (2005) (pointing out Congress's failure to build
incentives to report errors into the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2004 and
criticizing Congress's assumption that medical providers will file error reports voluntarily be-
cause they will have "little to lose").
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(a)(2)(A), 78u-4(a)(2)(A) (2000).
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sponsoring action [against issuers] are borne by the activists, while any
benefits fall proportionately among all members of the group. ' 37
Getting institutions to step from the sidelines onto the playing field
requires larger bonuses than individual investors historically received.
It costs individual investors little to serve as lead plaintiffs. They often
know nothing about the alleged fraud and contribute few other ser-
vices. 38 They also have low opportunity costs. Consequently, small
bonus payments are sufficient to win their consent. Institutional in-
vestors have more knowledge, higher out-of-pocket costs, and higher
opportunity costs. Assuming a rate of $100 per hour for personnel
time, Cox and Thomas estimated that "the cost of a reasonable case
management effort by an institutional investor lead plaintiff in an 'av-
erage' case would total between $25,000 and $100,000. ' ' 3 9
The opportunity cost might be considerably greater. Suppose a lead
plaintiff could spend two thousand hours managing a $100 million
hedge fund40 and earn the standard hedge fund management fee-2%
of assets ($2 million) plus 20% of returns of 10% per annum ($2 mil-
lion), for a total of $4 million.41 At this rate of return, the opportunity
cost of spending 250 to 1,000 hours on a securities lawsuit would be
between $500,000 and $2 million. Dollar-for-dollar reimbursement
provides no incentive to bear these costs. This is especially true in
light of the risk of losing the opportunity cost of diverting employees
from more profitable business activities to monitoring litigation, "the
potential for disclosure of proprietary nonpublic information," the
danger of losing access to inside information going forward, and the
possibility of being sued by disgruntled plaintiffs. 42
Some could argue that institutional investors can increase class-
wide recoveries and cut legal fees by serving as lead plaintiffs, thereby
boosting their own pro rata shares. Even if this were true-and it may
37. Cox & Thomas, supra note 2, at 1606.
38. Id. at 1608 (comparing the effort levels of individual investors and institutions and con-
cluding that lead plaintiffs who are individuals are not likely to engage in the extensive involve-
ment characteristic of institutions).
39. Id.
40. "The median hedge fund size in this year's survey was approximately $124 million." Press
Release, Hennessee Releases 9th Annual Hedge Fund Manage Survey (Apr. 3, 2003), available
at http://www.hennesseegroup.com/releases/release2003403.html.
41. "Hedge funds almost always have a fee structure that includes both a fixed fee and a
management fee. The fixed fee usually ranges between I and 2% of assets under management
and the management fee ranges between 20 and 25% of upside performance." Neil A. Chriss,
Introduction to Hedge Funds, Lecture at N.Y.U., Dec. 1998, available at http://www.math.nyu.
edu/faculty/chriss/neil/lecturel2/hedgefunds.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2007).
42. Cox & Thomas, supra note 2, at 1602; accord Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 12, at 2103.
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be 43-it would not encourage institutional investors to jump into the
fray. First, recoveries for all investors would grow in the manner de-
scribed if any institution were to step forward. Consequently, the ben-
eficial impact of institutional participation merely converts an
enormous collective action problem among all investors into a smaller
collective action problem among all institutions holding shares, with
each institutional investor wanting another to take the lead.44 Second,
because institutional investors can file conventional lawsuits at less
cost than class actions and with greater control, the possibility of in-
creasing the net recovery gives an institutional investor no reason to
represent a class. Individual lawsuits, however, do not vindicate other
investors' claims.45
In theory, public sector and union pension funds might behave like
other institutional investors. They might refrain from taking the helm
in securities class actions for the same reasons as other institutions.
Yet these funds have often stepped forward, and their activism ap-
pears to be increasing. Three forces appear to motivate them: weaker
ties to corporate boards, ideology, and political contributions.
A. Corporate Ties and Ideology
Relationships between public sector investment funds and public
companies are less cozy than those between private institutions and
those companies, partly because public sector funds do not depend on
public companies for business. They do not sell financial or other con-
sulting services that private institutions often find lucrative. Separa-
tion also occurs, because most trustees of public sector funds are
elected officials or political appointees whose motives are mixed. 46 As
fiduciaries, they must protect beneficiaries. As partisans, they must
cultivate political support. To some observers, the latter motivation
seems stronger: "researchers argue that politically-appointed trustees
43. Cox & Thomas, supra note 2, at 1631.
44. Jill Fisch described the problem as follows:
-[Ilnstitutions. particularly those concerned about minimizing administrative costs gen-
erally. are rationally apt to prefer that another investor take the initiative to become
involved.- In fact, one attorney who represents institutional investors in securities
fraud class actions told us that the first question his clients ask before considering un-
dertaking a lead plaintiff position is whether any other institution is willing to do it.
Id. at 1606 (quoting Jill E. Fisch. Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39
ARIz. L. REV. 533. 542 (1997)).
45. Id. at 1603 n.62 (reporting that institutions sometimes opt out of class actions and sue on
their own).
46. See Hess, supra note 3, at 195-200 (reporting that, of public sector funds in the PENDAT
database. 36% of the members of the average board were elected by beneficiaries, and the re-
mainder were elected officials or political appointees).
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do not make decisions based on the interests of pension beneficiaries,
but principally to improve their own political situations. '47 If this is
correct, partisan trustees should enlist their funds as lead plaintiffs
when they can "improve their own political situations" by doing so.
Presumably, the most beneficial cases are high-profile ones, like En-
ron and WorldCom, which can attract significant media attention and
generate substantial settlements. The findings generated by Cox and
Thomas suggest that public trustees focus on significant and serious
frauds. 48 Using multiple regression analysis, they determined that
public sector funds were more likely to become lead plaintiffs in cases
involving "large capitalization firms, with bigger estimated losses, and
when the SEC ha[d] filed a parallel action. ' 49
Ideology may also motivate public pension funds' trustees. They
may want to "fix the system" by "improv[ing] the effectiveness of class
action litigation," "strengthen [ing] the financial reporting process,"
and obtaining "recoveries from individual corporate officers and di-
rectors" rather than just their insurers. 50 The strategy of focusing on
high-profile cases is consistent with these objectives.
Labor union pension funds may also actively seek to become lead
plaintiffs for many of the same reasons. Labor leaders who manage
pension funds "often wear two hats, protecting their interests as share-
holders but also furthering their interests as workers. '51 These inter-
ests do not always conflict. 52 As shareholders, union members benefit
from measures that increase the value of their firms. They may also
benefit from measures, such as wage increases, that transfer wealth
from shareholders to workers-although this motivation seems un-
likely to figure strongly in their decisions to become lead plaintiffs.
Securities lawsuits have little potential to help workers as employees,
other than by improving corporate governance.
B. Political Contributions
Contributions to public sector fund trustees and union-related polit-
ical action committees came into vogue after Congress enacted the
PSLRA. In a further demonstration of the law of unintended conse-
quences, the Act replaced the much maligned race to the courthouse
47. Id. at 196.
48. Cox & Thomas, supra note 2, at 1630.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1605.
51. Id. at 1610 n.93.
52. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Share-
holder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018. 1074-84 (1998).
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with an equally reviled competition to curry the favor of pension fund
trustees. Political contributions are the currency of the new competi-
tion. Although the volume and frequency of class action lawyers' po-
litical contributions are unknown, anecdotal reports abound. A USA
Today article reported the following examples, which the newspaper
unearthed by studying campaign-finance records and pleadings: 53
" Lawyers who contributed $156,000 to Mayor Edward Rendell's
campaigns represented the City of Philadephia's Board of Pen-
sions and Retirement in a class-action case against Ikon Office
Solutions and shared more than $32 million in legal fees.54 The
same lawyers also contributed to Pennsylvania Treasurer Cathe-
rine Baker Knoll, who hired them to represent the state's pen-
sion funds.
* After the PSLRA took effect, law firms specializing in securities
class-action cases started contributing to Ken Duncan, Louisi-
ana's state treasurer and overseer of the state's retirement funds.
They also gave to the campaign of John Kennedy, who unseated
Duncan in 1999. After Duncan lost, a securities firm hired him
to help guide its quest to represent other public pension funds.
* Securities firms numbered among the top contributors to New
York City Comptroller Alan Hevesi, a noted activist who helped
hire these firms to represent the municipal pension system.55
These examples are the tip of the iceberg. Judging by the number of
stories and commentaries, as well as the strong push for regulation,
political contributions are widespread. 56
Class action lawyers also use lobbyists to advance "their efforts to
obtain the lead counsel position. ' 57 To confirm this, Cox and Thomas
visited "state-posted electronic information about lobbyists." 58 Their
53. Kevin McCoy, Campaign Contributions or Conflicts of Interest?, USA TODAY, Sept. 11,
2001, at B1.
54. Id.; see also In re IKON Office Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F.R.D. 166 (E.D. Pa. 2000)
(approving the proposed settlement).
55. McCoy, supra note 53; see also Karen Donovan, Legal Reform Turns a Steward Into an
Activist, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2005, at C1. Hevesi resigned under a cloud after being found to
have used state employees as chauffeurs and aides to his wife. Michael Cooper, Hevesi to Resign
and Avoid Jail, Official Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22. 2006, at Al.
56. For examples of contributions, see supra note 3 and accompanying text. See also In re
Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 144 (D.N.J. 1998) (rival for the position of lead plaintiff argued
that the New York State Pension Fund and the New York City Pension Fund should be disquali-
fied on the grounds that their overseers received political contributions from the lawyers they
retained); Daniel Fisher, Bedfellows, FORBES, Feb. 13, 2006, at 102 (reporting on contributions to
labor unions' political action committees by lawyers who represented the unions' pension funds
in securities class actions); Brian Grow, The Kings Of Class Actions. BUSINESS WEEK, May 16,
2005. at 50 (reporting on the success of class action lawyers known to have made political contri-
butions); Diana B. Henriques, Conflict Over Conflicts: Class-Action Lawyers Defend Their Polit-
ical Contributions. N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1998, at Cl.
57. Cox & Thomas, supra note 2, at 1613.
58. Id. at 1591.
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search revealed "evidence that plaintiffs' law firms have hired lobby-
ists in several states. ' 59 Because publicly available information on
lobbyist engagements is limited, law firms probably use them more
often than state websites reveal. Cox and Thomas "also learned from
pension fund officials that these lobbyists have attempted to persuade
them to act as lead plaintiffs. '60
The incentive to influence public officials arises in securities fraud
lawsuits, because the managers of public sector and union pension
funds decide whether these funds will serve as lead plaintiffs and
which lawyers they will hire. Under the PSLRA, the class member
with the largest stake is presumptively the most adequate lead plain-
tiff and will receive control of the case, including the right to appoint
class counsel and negotiate attorneys' fees.61 Public sector funds,
which collectively own over 10% of the domestic equities market,
often qualify for this role.62 Consequently, lawyers intent on becom-
ing class counsel find it advantageous to build relationships with pub-
lic sector fund trustees and to support activist trustees with political
contributions. By contributing, lawyers gain "access to politicians"
and "a chance to transact in the political marketplace. '63
Commentators uniformly find political contributions objectionable.
Professor Coffee urged Governor Elliot Spitzer to "address[ ] the 'pay
for play' practices associated with New York State's pension funds" as
part of an overall effort to clean up politics. 64 Cox and Thomas com-
plained that "the PSLRA was not enacted to create further angst over
how political fundraising might compromise the judgment and trust of
elected officials. ' 65 To date, however, there is little concrete evidence
of harm. Political contributions may cause lead plaintiffs to select less
qualified attorneys, approve cheap settlements, or offer inflated fees,66
but examples are hard to spot.67
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-I(a)(3)(B)(v) (2000) ("The most adequate lead plaintiff shall, subject to
the approval of the court, select and retain counsel to represent the class.").
62. Hess, supra note 3, at 195-200.
63. Fred S. McChesney, "Pay to Play" Politics Examined, with Lessons for Campaign-Finance
Reform, 6 THE INDEPENDENT REV. 345, 346 (2002).
64. See John C. Coffee, Jr., "When Smoke Gets In Your Eyes": Myth and Reality About the
Synthesis of Private Counsel and Public Client, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 241, 249 (2001); Coffee, Jr.,
supra note 28.
65. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 2, at 1617.
66. See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 28 (arguing that the clearest problem caused by political
contributions "is that a conflicted client is less likely to object to a cheap settlement favored by
the plaintiff's law firm or to an inflated plaintiff's fee award").
67. See Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel
by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 703-10 (2002) (finding that institutional investors hired
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Assuming those who condemn political contributions are right, the
surest way to eliminate these payments would be to privatize the oper-
ation of public employees' pension funds. Private companies often
manage public employees' money. Public employees might even ben-
efit from privatization, which can improve returns and harmonize the
interests of managers and beneficiaries. 68 Such benefits would likely
come at the cost of higher private sector pension fund salaries and the
accompanying envy, however. Privatization would not eliminate class
action lawyers' incentives to seek business, but would convert the ac-
tivity from raising fears of public corruption to private sector
solicitation.
Critics of pay to play in securities class actions have not recom-
mended privatization. Most have called for regulations limiting or
prohibiting political contributions. Both Professor Coffee and Profes-
sors Cox and Thomas would bar public officials from employing con-
tractors from whom they receive political contributions,69 a ban
already in place in some states. ° In support of this suggestion, these
commentators point to a regulation adopted in 1994 by the Municipal
Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) "to govern relationships be-
tween broker-dealers who underwrite municipal securities and the
elected officials who select the underwriters. '71 Others share the de-
sire to extend the MSRB approach to class-action attorneys. 72
Unfortunately, the MSRB has had difficulty preventing dealers and
other municipal finance professionals (MFPs) from using political
contributions to influence assignments. After the MSRB's basic pro-
hibition appeared in 1994, MFPs started using consultants as conduits
for contributions, causing the MSRB to adopt a second prohibition in
high-quality law firms, established long-term relationships with them, reduced fees, and used fee
arrangements that reduced agency costs).
68. Hess, supra note 3, at 195-200.
69. See Coffee, Jr., Nobody Asked Me, supra note 28; Coffee. Jr., When Smoke Gets in Your
Eyes. supra note 64; Cox & Thomas. supra note 2, at 1614. Cox and Thomas also recommended
that lawyers disclose political contributions to judges and institutions to develop internal proce-
dures to weaken contributions' impact. Id. at 1638-39.
70. McCoy, supra note 53 (reporting that Connecticut and Vermont have such prohibitions).
See also Pauline A. Schneider, Attempts to Limit Political Contributions by Municipal Finance
Professionals and Lawyers, 1508 PLI/CoRP 345, 355 (Sept. 2005) (reporting that New Jersey,
Connecticut. Wisconsin, Tennessee, and Illinois "prohibit contracts for periods of time with com-
panies or individuals that have made political contributions to elected officials who are in a
position to influence the award of contracts").
71. Cox & Thomas, supra note 2, at 1614-15.
72. INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITFEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION (Dec. 5, 2006),
available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/ll.30Committee-Interim-ReportREV2.pdf.
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1996. 73 Money also flowed via bond attorneys, according to New
York Senator Franz S. Leichter, who found that New York's fourteen
largest bond counsel firms gave more than $530,000 to state politicians
from 1994 to 1997.74 In 2003, the MSRB noted "increasing signs" that
its rules were deficient,75 as reports circulated of the widespread use
of lobbyists and political consultants. 76 In 2005, the MSRB again
amended its rules, prohibiting dealers, their affiliated entities, and
their MFPs from soliciting others "to make or coordinate contribu-
tions to an official of an issuer from which the dealer is seeking munic-
ipal securities business. '77 In 2006, the National Association of
Securities Dealers, which enforces MSRB rules, announced that it
would significantly increase penalties for violations of the rules regu-
lating political contributions, again suggesting dissatisfaction with the
existing regime. 78
The history of the MSRB's efforts reflects a general problem: al-
though regulations can redirect the flow of money from businesses to
public officials with the power to assign valuable contracts, they can-
not wholly impede it. For this reason, efforts to regulate contributions
from class action lawyers to officials associated with public sector pen-
sion funds are also likely to enjoy limited success. Such regulations
may also have unintended consequences stemming from Congress's
failure to build selective incentives into the PSLRA. The growing in-
volvement of public sector and union pension funds in securities class
actions may reflect the impact of political contributions. If so, a suc-
cessful effort to staunch these contributions may remove the incen-
73. Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, MSRB Notice 2003-32 (Aug. 6, 2003), available
at http://www.msrb.org/MSRBl/archive/G-3738August2003.htm.
74. James Dao, Proposal to Restrict Campaign Contributions by Bond Lawyers Sets off a De-
bate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1997, at 22.
75. According to the MSRB, MFPs were making the following:
[Playments to political parties or non-dealer controlled PACs that find their way to
issuer officials, significant political contributions by dealer affiliates (e.g., bank holding
companies and affiliated derivative counterparty subsidiaries) to both issuer officials
and political parties, contributions by associated persons of the dealer who are not
MFPs and by the spouses and family members of MFPs to issuer officials, and the use
of consultants who make or bundle political contributions. In addition to dealer and
dealer-related giving, the [MSRB] [wa]s also concerned about media and other reports
regarding significant giving by other market participants, including independent finan-
cial advisors, swap advisors, swap counterparties, investment contract providers and
public finance lawyers.
Id.
76. See, e.g., Justin Pope, With Bond Business Lobbying Thriving, Regulators Mull Ban, Post-
gazette.com, Mar. 29, 2004, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/pp/040891291944.stm.
77. Schneider, supra note 70, at 352.
78. Lynn Hume, Bigger Fines For MSRB Violations: New Penalties Slated to Rise as Much as
2000%, Mar. 14, 2006, http://www.financial-planning.com/pubs/fpi/20060314101.html.
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tives these funds have to volunteer, placing more securities class
actions under the control of individual investors. This would under-
mine the PSLRA. Assuming the desirability of having sophisticated
investors with large holdings at the helm, the best approach would not
prohibit political contributions, but would render them unnecessary
and irrelevant by creating other selective incentives. Part V discusses
three such proposals.
V. BUILDING SELECTIVE INCENTIVES INTO THE PSLRA
Although widely despised, political contributions have an important
upside: they provide selective incentives for trustees to volunteer
public sector and union funds as lead plaintiffs. If policymakers
barred political contributions, these incentives would be lost. Because
"public pension funds are generally viewed as the best potential
monitors in securities class actions," such a bar would undermine the
PSLRA.7 9
Political contributions are poorly suited to the task of motivating
trustees to volunteer investment funds as lead plaintiffs. First, be-
cause these contributions flow to trustees rather than funds, they may
cause the interests of trustees and funds to conflict. Partisan trustees
want to maximize the flow of contributions to themselves or their sup-
porters. Fund beneficiaries want to maximize the value of their pen-
sions. Trustees may therefore litigate more or less than beneficiaries
rationally want.80
Second, political contributions divert wealth from beneficiaries to
other targets. The process of making and receiving political contribu-
tions can be conceptualized as an all-pay auction in which partisan
trustees are selling and lawyers are bidding for the opportunity to earn
fees in securities class actions. The value of this opportunity should
flow to fund beneficiaries who lost investment dollars, not to partisan
trustees who have other sources of compensation for time spent run-
ning public sector funds.
Third, judging from experience, political contributions do little to
convince private institutional investors to enter the fray. Because pri-
79. Michael A. Perino, Markets and Monitors: The Impact of Competition and Experience on
Attorneys' Fees in Securities Class Actions, at 15 (St. John's Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper
Series, No. 06-0034, Jan. 2006), available at http:/papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
870577.
80. In theory, political contributions can encourage public sector and union pension funds to
sue or discourage them from suing. In practice, contributions given to discourage funds from
stepping forward have not been reported.
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vate investors may be the best lead plaintiffs in many cases, an incen-
tive system that appeals to them would be desirable.
Fourth, political contributions taint class counsel appointments.
Even if the taint is unwarranted in most cases-because partisan trust-
ees hire outstanding attorneys and set their compensation at market
ratesS-it is unfortunate and costly. The appearance of impropriety
may undermine judges' confidence in lead plaintiffs' decisions and in-
dependence. It also creates disputes, as lawyers and investors compet-
ing for control of class actions use evidence of contributions to attack
others' integrity.
It would be easy for policymakers to incorporate a better set of se-
lective incentives into the PSLRA. The remainder of this Part consid-
ers several possibilities. The first proposal-awarding a lead plaintiff
bonus-would require the smallest change to the PSLRA and would
be most faithful to Congress's desire to place the lead plaintiff with
the largest financial stake at the helm. The other proposals, which
involve the use of auctions, are designed to put control in the hands of
highly motivated investors to maximize class-wide recoveries, even
more so than typical institutional investors. The investors who win the
auctions may hold large blocks of securities prelitigation, but need
not. These proposals thus depart from Congress's lead plaintiff
model. As shown below, however, Congress's model has important
defects.
A. Award Lead Plaintiff Bonuses
By prohibiting lead plaintiffs from receiving more than their pro
rata shares of class-wide recoveries, the PSLRA entrenches the eco-
nomic rationality of free-riding, ensuring that most institutional inves-
tors remain on the sidelines. This shortcoming can be repaired. For
example, Congress could require judges to appoint as lead plaintiff the
investor with the largest stake regardless of whether that investor ap-
plied for the post.8 2 The downside of this approach would be the risk
of appointing an investor who did not want to be a lead plaintiff and
would likely do a poor job, such as by settling immediately at a fire-
81. Coffee, Jr., When Smoke Gets In Your Eyes, supra note 64, at 246 ("[T]he attorneys who
donate the most to the state controller of their choice are probably among the most able liti-
gators who are most likely to maximize the state's recovery."). In Cendant, where political con-
tributions led to considerable mudslinging, the lead plaintiffs negotiated a fee $76 million below
the lowest bid generated by the trial court's auction. 182 F.R.D. 144 (D.N.J. 1998). See gener-
ally Perino, supra note 22 (finding that, in percentage terms, fee awards are lower in class actions
led by public pension funds).
82. How judges would assemble lists of investors by size is a matter we do not consider, given
the hypothetical nature of this proposal.
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sale price to avoid litigation. One might consider an investor's ex-
pressed desire to become lead plaintiff a minimum condition for ade-
quacy. Recognizing this, the PSLRA requires a judge to appoint the
investor with the largest financial stake from the pool of investors who
initiate litigation or nominate themselves after receiving notice.
Congress could also address free-riding by building selective incen-
tives into the PSLRA. For example, Congress could authorize lead
plaintiff bonuses. Although there is substantial latitude in formulating
a bonus, its design should induce institutional investors to serve as
lead plaintiffs. This would require larger bonuses for institutional in-
vestors than for individuals, as previously explained.8 3
A formula linking the bonus to the lead plaintiff's relative owner-
ship interest would accomplish this result automatically. A lead plain-
tiff with X shares of an issuer's stock might receive a fraction of the
class-wide recovery based on 2X. For example, suppose an issuer had
900,000 shares outstanding and a lead plaintiff held 100,000 of these
(11%). The court would treat the lead plaintiff as holding 200,000
shares, bringing the total number of outstanding shares to one million.
The lead plaintiff would then own 20% (200,000 divided by 1,000,000)
of the recovery, and the bonus would be 9%.84
In the preceding example, one could use a multiplier of three-or
any other number greater than one-rather than two. If Congress
tied the formula to the size of an investor's holdings, institutional in-
vestors would receive larger bonuses than individual investors, be-
cause they typically hold larger blocks of shares.8 5 Among institutions
holding large blocks, the formula would also give the largest stake-
83. See supra Part IV.
84. The decision to use shares owned reflects the usual practice of allocating settlement funds
on this basis. For simplicity, this example assumes that all investors bought shares at the start of
the class period and held them until it ended. In other words, it assumes no trading. It also
ignores other complications, such as options and multiple classes of stock. If these simplifica-
tions make the example seem unrealistic, one could tie the lead plaintiff bonuses to investors'
losses, as the PSLRA does for the lead plaintiff position, rather than to the number of shares
held. A lead plaintiff that lost $100 million would be treated as having lost $200 million.
85. The formula proposed in the text would work poorly if a single institutional investor held
an enormous fraction of an issuer's stock-for example, 95%. In these situations, the lead plain-
tiff's bonus would be small relative to its existing stake. Of course, in these situations the main
investors' incentive to free-ride would also be minuscule. In any event, such situations are rare.
Professors Weiss and Beckerman examined institutional investors' holdings in companies sued
for securities fraud and found no instance in which a single investor held even a majority of the
issuer's stock. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 12, at 2089-93. This is for good reason: a major-
ity owner might monitor the firm well enough to prevent misdeeds or might play an active role in
misdeeds, seeking to transfer wealth from minority shareholders to itself. Should policymakers
think the need exists, they could deal with this remote contingency by capping the bonus so that
the lead plaintiff's share would never expand above 30% of the recovery. A lead plaintiff with a
share of 30% or more would receive no bonus.
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holder the largest reward, targeting the strongest selective incentive at
the investor Congress had in its sights when crafting the PSLRA's lead
plaintiff provision. A bonus tied to both the lead plaintiff's stake and
the class-wide recovery would also enhance the lead plaintiff's incen-
tive to maximize the recovery, making its recommendations regarding
settlement more credible.
The proposed lead plaintiff bonus might be modified to accommo-
date a peculiar feature of the PSLRA, which identifies the "person or
group of persons" with the largest financial stake as the presumptively
most adequate plaintiff.86 Investor groups have won control of many
cases, sometimes to the exclusion of institutions that also volunteered
to serve as lead plaintiffs.87 This preference for investor groups is
questionable. First, the groups suffer internal collective action
problems. Every member wants other members to bear the cost of
running the lawsuit. To overcome these problems, group members
must expend resources that might otherwise be used to maximize the
collective recovery. Second, there is no obvious reason to expect
group members with small claims to perform better as lead plaintiffs
than individual investors who control lawsuits on their own. Why
should an investor with a small stake do a better job of selecting class
counsel or bargaining over fees simply by virtue of belonging to a
group? Third, to the extent that externally motivated investor groups
exist, these groups must waste resources competing to become the
largest group.
Still, the PSLRA expressly provides for lead plaintiff investor
groups, and this may be advantageous. 88 It would be easy to preserve
this option while also offering the lead plaintiff bonus proposed in this
Section. One could simply treat each member of a group as an indi-
vidual lead plaintiff and award that person a bonus tied to the size of
her stake. If the investors collectively held 100,000 shares, they would
receive a fraction of the class-wide recovery based on ownership of
200,000 shares, as was true for a single lead plaintiff in the example
above.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (2000) (emphasis added).
87. Cox & Thomas, supra note 2, at 1619.
88. Id. at 1639 (reporting that investor groups perform better than individuals in large cases, a
finding that they attribute to the presence of individuals with sizeable stakes or institutions in
those investor groups).
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B. Auction Lead Plaintiff Bonuses8 9
One could also create a selective incentive for the investor best able
to represent a class to step forward by auctioning a recovery attached
to the lead plaintiff spot. After notifying all class members that litiga-
tion has commenced and inviting them to apply for the lead plaintiff
position, the court would sell a standardized share of the gross recov-
ery-20%-to the highest bidder. The court would hold the price
paid by the winning investor for subsequent distribution to the class.
Competition in these auctions should be brisk. The possibility of
obtaining a sizeable piece of a class-wide recovery at a bargain price
should entice investors who would ordinarily free-ride. Price-
waterhouseCoopers reported average settlement amounts of $71.1
million for securities class actions resolved in 2005. 90 Thirty settle-
ments exceeded $20 million. A 20% share of a successful case would
be worth owning. 91
Selling shares of this size would also put plaintiffs with large finan-
cial stakes in charge of every case. Under existing arrangements,
small investors often serve as lead plaintiffs, partly because no inves-
tor holds a large fraction of an issuer's securities. 92 Free-riding also
contributes, because institutional investors with larger holdings simply
fail to step forward. The proposed auction would thus convey two
89. Many sources address the possible use of auctions to regulate attorneys' fees in class
actions. The consensus appears to be that the PSLRA, which assigns the lead plaintiff the power
to "select and retain counsel to represent the class" subject only to judicial approval, prohibits
the use of auctions for this purpose. See, e.g., Sherrie R. Savett, Plaintiffs' Vision of Securities
Litigation: Trends/Strategies in 2005-2007, 1620 PLI/CoRP. 57, 87 (Sept.-Oct. 2007) (summarizing
authorities and observing that "there has not been a single lead plaintiff/lead counsel
determination based on bidding" since 2002). Other objections to class counsel auctions have
also been raised, such as the plausible contention that the cheapest lawyer may not be the best
lawyer for a class. For thorough discussions, see Fisch, supra note 67; Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation,
Auctions, and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead Counsel Under the PSLRA, 64 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 53 (Spring/Summer 2001); and Proceedings of the 2001 Third Circuit Task
Force on the Selection of Lead Counsel, available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/classcounsel/.
Without endorsing these objections, it is important to note that many of them do not extend
naturally to lead plaintiff auctions. The "cheapest lawyer" objection is one of these. The auction
this Article proposes involves paying a cash bid in exchange for a fixed percentage of the
recovery, which selects for the lawyer/plaintiff combination with the highest expected recovery.
90. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2005 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 18 (2006). Price-
waterhouseCoopers reported median settlement amounts of $9.25 million for securities class ac-
tions resolved in 2005. Certain mega-settlements were excluded when the average and mean
values were calculated.
91. The expected value would be less if one included unsuccessful cases.
92. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 12, at 2089-94 (reporting many instances in which the
single largest claimant accounted for less than 10% of dollars paid out in a class action settle-
ment and reporting that the mean share accounted for by the largest single claimant in twenty
cases studied was 13.1%). In many cases, then, auctioning even a 10% share of the recovery
would strengthen the lead plaintiff's incentive substantially.
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advantages. In cases that currently lack investors with large holdings,
it would create them. In cases where investors with large holdings
exist but currently remain passive, it would encourage them to step
forward by rewarding participation.
Competition should also redress two shortcomings of the first pro-
posal, one of which is also associated with current practice. Under
existing law, multiple investors seeking the role of lead plaintiff some-
times claim to have the largest financial stake in the defendant corpo-
ration. This competition produces litigation, 93 which also occurs when
claimants seek to better their odds of becoming lead plaintiffs by
forming investor groups.94 Auctions would eliminate wasteful dis-
putes over the size of investors' stakes by awarding control to the
highest bidders.
An auction would also be superior to the lead plaintiff incentive
bonus, because it would set the net cost of the bonus at the lowest
level sufficient to attract a savvy and highly incentivized litigation
manager. The proposal set out in the preceding Section tied the size
of the bonus to the lead plaintiff's investment, an arrangement calcu-
lated to give bigger investors stronger incentives. However, in any
given case, this rough arrangement may generate a bonus that is too
large or too small. In one limiting case, it might confer an additional
payment on an investor who would happily take the lead without one.
Here, the class would bear a needless cost. In another limiting case,
the bonus might be too small to convince the best litigation manager
to sign on. Here, a class would likely benefit by paying more.
By auctioning the lead plaintiff bonus, judges would create markets
in which investors reveal their valuations. Investors would assemble
litigation teams to evaluate cases and establish bid amounts. The high
bidder for the bonus share would then be the investor capable of max-
imizing the share's expected net value. This bidder would also likely
be the class member best able to maximize the net expected value of
the entire case.
By selling a 20% share to the highest bidder, a judge would also
reduce the class's net cost of the bonus to the lowest level sufficient to
93. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 206 F.R.D. 427 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (discussing the size
of competing plaintiffs' claims and the law governing this determination); Beth Bar, Lerach's Bid
for Lead Counsel Status Rejected in Comverse Class Action, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 6, 2007, at 1 (report-
ing that a district court judge reversed a magistrate judge's decision to appoint the Plumbers and
Pipefitters National Pension Fund lead plaintiff on finding that another investor, "the Menorah
Group, purchased the greatest number of net shares of [the defendant's] stock, [and] expended
the greatest number of net funds and suffered the greatest loss." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
94. Cox & Thomas, supra note 2, at 1619.
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attract the best lead plaintiff. The class would recover not just 80% of
the settlement (the amount remaining after paying the lead plaintiff),
but 80% plus the amount paid by the lead plaintiff for the right to
represent the class. The high bidder's payment would help the class.
Bids would also vary with the merits of a case. The stronger the
case, the smaller the premium needed to convince a potential lead
plaintiff to step forward. Because the lead plaintiff would trade cash
up front for a much larger share of the recovery, the lead plaintiff's
incentive to maximize the recovery would be strong, even in easy
cases that require small premiums. For example, suppose the high
bidder paid $15 million for a 20% lead plaintiff share expected to be
worth $20 million out of a $100 million recovery. The premium would
therefore only be $5 million ($20 million - $15 million = $5 million) in
a case with an expected gross recovery of $100 million and a $95 mil-
lion recovery for the class after subtracting the lead plaintiff bonus
($100 million - $20 million + $15 million = $95 million). The proposed
auction would cost the class something, but would also strengthen the
lead plaintiff's incentive considerably. The improved incentive would
further reduce the cost-or perhaps even eliminate it-by improving
litigation governance and generating higher returns.
Institutional investors with large holdings would enjoy advantages
in these competitions, but would not be guaranteed to win. Their po-
sition would still be privileged. First, as repeat players in lead plaintiff
auctions, they could amortize the fixed costs of case evaluations across
a series of competitions. Second, they could afford to be risk neutral.
A $500,000 loss in a single lawsuit might devastate a small investor.
The same loss would merely be unpleasant for the managers of a $100
million investment fund. Third, institutional investors' larger preliti-
gation holdings would reduce agency costs and give them stronger in-
centives to bid. Compare an institution holding 10% of an issuer's
securities prelitigation to an individual investor holding 0.5%. After
winning the 20% stake to be sold at auction (ignoring attorneys' fees),
the institution would own 28% of the recovery. The individual inves-
tor would barely own more than 20%. The institutional investor
would therefore internalize about 40% more-.28 versus .20-of the
return on each dollar expended in litigation. Thus, the institution's
incentive to invest in the case would exceed the individual's, making
the case worth more in the institution's hands and enabling it to out-
bid the individual. Having a larger share, the institutional investor
would also be more concerned about attorneys' fees and would pre-
sumably invest more effort in setting them correctly. The large share
creates a responsibility for the manager and provides an indirect in-
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centive to manage the size of the fee. This indirect incentive would
likely mitigate the effect of lobbyists' political contributions and other
emoluments.
Institutions with large holdings would not always prevail in auc-
tions, however. They would predictably lose to investors with smaller
stakes who were superior litigation managers. Given the number of
cases filed per year-between one hundred and two hundred-and,
therefore, the number of auctions, one might expect litigation special-
ists to emerge. These specialists, who might be small- or medium-
sized investors closely aligned with excellent class action attorneys,
could outbid institutional investors in many cases.
The possibility that an investor with a smaller stake could outbid
one with a larger stake signals yet another flaw in the PSLRA, not a
defect in the auction proposal. The PSLRA uses an investor's finan-
cial stake as a proxy for ability to maximize a class action recovery.
The proxy may be flawed. 95 Interest conflicts may undermine large
investors' enthusiasm for litigation. Institutions with large stakes may
also be inferior litigators. Their profession is investing, not litigating.
Few institutions lead more than one or two cases per year.96 Assum-
ing a properly designed auction, a plaintiff's willingness to pay for the
lead position would better indicate its ability to maximize the ex-
pected recovery than the size of its investment.
An example may be helpful here. Suppose Investor A, which holds
5% of an issuer's securities, thinks that, if he gains control of a lawsuit,
a 20% share of the expected recovery is worth $30 million. Now sup-
pose Investor B, a litigation specialist, who holds only 1% of the se-
curities, thinks the same share would be worth $60 million if he were
in charge. Ceteris paribus, Investor B will bid more for the lead plain-
95. For example, some contend that public sector funds make the best lead plaintiffs because
they have large investment portfolios and fewer conflicts than private funds. See Perino, supra
note 22. This is a contestable proposition. Public sector trustees may or may not be sophisti-
cated litigation managers. Moreover, it is not self evident that financial stake should be determi-
native when, as sometimes occurs, multiple public sector funds volunteer to be the lead plaintiff.
A public fund with a 5% stake could be a better litigation manager than one with a 5.5% stake.
A multi-attribute auction that includes both stake and cash payment could standardize the
weight that courts apply to each. This Article strongly recommends that courts determine such
weights before an auction rather than using an auction as the opening round of a hearing.
96. Reacting against "professional plaintiffs," Congress limited the number of times an inves-
tor can hold the lead plaintiff position. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(vi), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi)
(2000) ("[A] person may be a lead plaintiff, or an officer, director, or fiduciary of a lead plaintiff,
in no more than 5 securities class actions brought as plaintiff class actions pursuant to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure during any 3-year period."). This prohibition may have made
sense when lead plaintiffs were figureheads. It is unwarranted in a world where lead plaintiffs
are effective litigants.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
tiff position than Investor A. Other class members will benefit as a
result, because the better lead plaintiff will be at the helm. 97
The PSLRA limits the frequency with which the same person may
appear as a lead plaintiff. 98 In theory, this restriction could prevent
specialists from developing. In practice, it may be toothless. 99 It ex-
pressly allows judges to make exceptions "consistent with the pur-
poses of [the lead plaintiff provision]."' 00 It is also written in a way
that may allow litigation specialists to use strategic behavior to nullify
it, perhaps by employing investors who have not previously served as
lead plaintiffs.
Even so, the merits of the restriction should be considered. Why
limit the frequency with which investors can serve as lead plaintiffs?
Practices prevailing before the adoption of the PSLRA were influen-
tial: "Once, some securities class lawyers used professional plaintiffs
who held very diversified portfolios with a few shares in most compa-
nies."''1 These professional plaintiffs were not litigation specialists;
they were hand-picked clients, who were valuable because of their
availability and their willingness to serve without asking questions.
Because they possessed small stakes, they had little reason to actively
manage the lawsuits in which they appeared.
The auctions proposed in this Section would not facilitate the return
of the professional plaintiffs, whose activities Congress sought to regu-
late via the PSLRA. They would favor litigation specialists and would
incentivize those specialists to maximize shareholders' recoveries.
The restriction on professional plaintiffs should therefore not apply to
auction winners. It may even have outlived its usefulness already.
The large public sector and union funds that currently serve as lead
plaintiffs are gaining experience as litigation managers and building
track records in large cases. "[A] demonstrated record as a diligent
monitor of the present suit, when coupled with a good track record of
being such a monitor in other cases, should .. .persuade the court
97. If other things are not equal, good litigation specialists will be rewarded and poor litiga-
tion specialists will be punished, causing them to exit the industry quickly. Poor litigation spe-
cialists will pay more in auction bids than they receive in fees or receive returns on their bids that
are unprofitable. Neither result is viable over the long-haul.
98. See supra note 96.
99. But cf In re Enron Corp. Sec. Litig., 206 F.R.D. 427 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (rejecting the Florida
State Board of Administration's bid for lead plaintiff position partly because of prior involve-
ments in class actions exceeding the limit set in the professional plaintiff provision).
100. Id. at 443.
101. Coffee, Jr., supra note 28, at 7.
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that the petitioning institution has only the positive characteristics as-
sociated with being a professional plaintiff. '10 2
As noted above, the PSLRA allows groups of investors to serve as
lead plaintiffs. If the auction approach proposed in this Section were
in place, the need for this provision would disappear. Every auction
would produce a single winner, whose incentives would be superior to
those of most lead plaintiffs selected today. The winner could be a
consortium of stockholders, but whether it is a group or individual
would be inconsequential. A consortium could handle its internal op-
erations contractually and participate in an auction as a single person
or entity.10 3
Auctions would favor investor groups only when groups were in the
best position to maximize expected recoveries. In theory, a group of
investors could solve internal difficulties and become a superior litiga-
tion manager. That group would be able to win auctions by outbid-
ding its competitors. It would pay the most for the proposed lead
plaintiff bonus, because it could generate the highest expected recov-
ery. This is precisely when a group should gain control of a class.
Like the simple bonus proposed above, an auction would also in-
centivize all types of investors, including private sector funds. By
choosing to stay on the sidelines, managers would forfeit the opportu-
nity to earn profits for private funds. In effect, auctions would reverse
the current state of affairs, in which managers' fiduciary duties en-
courage them to free-ride, by creating opportunities for their funds to
make significant returns. For example, suppose an auction presents
an opportunity to bid on a 20% share in a lawsuit with a $100 million
expected recovery. Suppose further that no investors bid, so that a $1
bid would win. By failing to bid $1, a manager would deprive a group
of fund beneficiaries of an expected $30 million, surely an act of mal-
feasance.10 4 To guard against breach of duty lawsuits by disgruntled
beneficiaries, fund managers would submit bids at defensible levels.
This would encourage competition. 0 5
102. Cox & Thomas, supra note 2, at 1638.
103. A similar problem arises in class actions and consolidations, where attorneys working in
groups often use contracts to assign burdens and benefits. See Charles Silver, Comparing Class
Actions and Consolidations, 10 REV. LITIG. 495 (1991).
104. This example ignores other costs a private fund may incur while serving as a lead
plaintiff.
105. Auctions would reduce, but perhaps not eliminate, the incentive large investors some-
times have to opt out of class actions and sue on their own. The incentive would diminish be-
cause auctions would be likely to put high-quality litigation managers in charge of class suits,
making separate litigation less attractive. The incentive would not disappear, however, because
auctions would not eliminate the problem of claim dilution that sometimes occurs when institu-
tions' claims are mixed with those of individual investors.
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Although a 20% bonus would help accomplish Congress's objective
of moving from lawyer-driven to plaintiff-driven litigation, it might
not succeed entirely. Class counsel's interests could still exceed a lead
plaintiff's stake. Historically, fee and cost awards have often ex-
ceeded 20%. Fees in this range have also been awarded in cases com-
menced after the effective date of the PSLRA. If the person with the
largest stake calls the shots, lawyers may continue to run many class
actions.
On the other hand, lead plaintiffs have the power to keep domi-
neering lawyers in check. A lead plaintiff can fire its law firm or use
the prospect of future business to elicit cooperation. At the end of a
case, a lead plaintiff can also ask a judge to reduce class counsel's fee.
But would a lead plaintiff be sufficiently independent and headstrong
to apply these punishments? The auction proposed in this Section
would be more likely to put such plaintiffs in charge of class actions
for two reasons. First, all lead plaintiffs would have more "skin in the
game"-after winning the auction, a lead plaintiff holding 5% of a
company's securities would own more than 20% of the class-wide re-
covery. Lead plaintiffs rarely have interests this sizeable today. 0 6 By
increasing the lead plaintiff's stake, auctions would make independent
judgment more likely. Second, the sunk costs associated with the bid-
ding process would even the scales psychologically, if not economi-
cally. Having paid, for example, $1 million for a 20% share, a lead
plaintiff would likely consider itself an equal partner with class coun-
sel.10 7 The equalizing effect of sunk costs may be especially important
in cases led by public sector investment funds, whose trustees received
political contributions. Having spent $1 million in fund assets 10 8 to
obtain the lead role, a trustee would face special pressure to show that
political contributions did not influence her judgment when hiring
counsel.
106. Cox & Thomas. supra note 2, at 1620 (reporting that in only two of the public pension
fund cases in their data set did the lead plaintiff hold over 25% of the claims made in the case).
107. Counsel's sunk costs may vary enormously in size. Especially after the PSLRA imposed
a heightened pleading standard on securities fraud cases, lawyers often expended significant re-
sources before formal discovery occurred to acquire information about wrongdoing. In those
cases where significant costs are incurred by counsel, a lead-plaintiff auction would still empower
lead plaintiffs.
108. An interesting question is whether to allow persons bidding for the lead plaintiff role to
use funds supplied by others, such as lawyers seeking to become class counsel. Allowing this
would completely vacate the interest in having non-lawyer plaintiffs lead the litigation. Never-
theless, the team would be highly motivated with a well-established property right in the out-
come. If the lack of independence in setting fees and establishing settlement currency can be
cabined. lawyer-funded litigation may be more beneficial to the class.
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By substantially increasing the lead plaintiff's share of recovery, this
proposal offers new opportunities to efficiently set attorneys' fees.
For example, Congress could allow the winning bidder to set the fee
percentage, while also requiring the winner to pay half of the final fee
award. To see how this might work, suppose that the lead plaintiff
holds a 20% share of the recovery and promises class counsel a 25%
fee. Now suppose the lawsuit settles for $100 million. Class counsel
would receive $25 million in fees, with the lead plaintiff and the class
each contributing $12.5 million. The lead plaintiff would net $7.5 mil-
lion ($20 million - $12.5 million = $7.5 million). Saddling the lead
plaintiff with a disproportionate fee obligation would create an incen-
tive to avoid overpaying.
This incentive would not be perfect. Only concentrating 100% of
the recovery interest in the hands of a single owner could encourage
optimal fee setting. Under the hypothesized arrangement, the lead
plaintiff would pay 50% of the marginal cost of litigation, but only get
25% of the marginal benefit. Presumably, this incentive mismatch
would cause the lead plaintiff to underinvest. Even so, the proposed
arrangement would be an improvement. First, the lead plaintiff's
stake would be large enough to make it difficult for attorneys to use
political contributions or other means to inflate their fees. Second,
charging lead plaintiffs disproportionately for class counsel fees would
discourage the lead plaintiff from favoring class counsel over the class.
Third, the proposed mechanism would reduce the pressure on judges
to cut fee requests by incentivizing lead plaintiffs to do that job up
front.
The last point is worth expanding. Fee awards in class actions are
highly controversial.10 9 Few judges want to be known for making
plaintiffs' attorneys millionaires. Judges also bear a duty to protect
absent class members from exploitation. Consequently, judges often
cut lawyers' fee requests. Yet, when enormous fee awards are needed
to incentivize attorneys to maximize class members' recoveries, enor-
mous fees should be paid. Under existing arrangements, the urge to
reduce fees below efficient levels probably wins out more often than it
should. Judges usually set fees ex post, after they know the size of the
proposed settlement and have eliminated the litigation risks. Judges
also lack the data and economic models needed to optimally set fees.
109. The literature on fee awards is far too vast to summarize here. Many of the points made
in that literature can be found in Task Force on Contingent Fees. Tort Trial & Ins. Practice Sec.
of the Am. Bar Ass'n, Report on Contingent Fees in Class Action Litigation, 25 REV. LrIG. 459
(2006). See also Charles M. Silver, Dissent from Recommendation to Set Fees Ex Post. 25 REV.
Lrrio. 497 (2006).
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Finally, the cost of setting fees too low is invisible. The recovery, had
the lawyers been optimally incentivized, is unknown. Consequently,
no one can calculate the difference between the actual settlement and
the optimal recovery.
The existing fee setting process also requires judges to step out of
their customary roles. As absent plaintiffs' guardians, judges are sup-
posed to select the best named plaintiffs and lawyers for a class and
motivate the class's agents to maximize the net recovery. These are
odd tasks for judges to perform. The best lead plaintiff, lawyer, and
fee arrangement for the absent class members are the worst lead
plaintiff, lawyer, and fee arrangement for the defendant. In effect,
judges are supposed to help build litigation teams that enable class
members to extract payments from defendants and design those teams
so as to make the payments as large as possible. To describe this role
is to wonder how neutral judges can play it.
C. Auction Shares of Gross Recovery from Which
Class Counsel Must Be Paid
Finally, the authors' preferred approach is as follows: a simple auc-
tion in which persons-including but not limited to institutional inves-
tors-would bid for ownership of 30% of any funds recovered by
judgment or settlement in a particular case." 0 This approach would
eliminate fee and cost awards from common funds, judicial control of
fees and costs, and bonus payments for lead plaintiffs. Lead plaintiffs
would set fees and pay them from their own recoveries. Class mem-
bers would share the remaining 70% of the recovery, plus the amount
paid by the winning bidder.
This approach resembles the lead plaintiff bonus auction described
in the preceding Section. The highest bidder wins the right to a dis-
proportionate share of the recovery after paying the amount bid into
the court for subsequent distribution to the rest of the class. The high
bidder is then appointed lead plaintiff and retains class counsel, offer-
ing as fees whatever terms she desires, including a flat fee, an hourly
rate, or a contingent fraction of the high bidder's recovery. In practi-
cal effect, the lead plaintiff would spend her own money when hiring
class counsel, eliminating the danger of overspending and the need for
judicial review of the fee. The lead plaintiff's share is larger-30%
110. In theory, bidding could be opened to all comers, including noninvestors and even the
defendant. In practice, one may wish to limit bidding to investors to avoid controversies over
standing. Allowing a defendant to bid would raise different problems. including asymmetric
access to inside information about alleged misconduct.
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versus 20%-reflecting the lead plaintiff's increased responsibility for
the fee.
The lead plaintiff's 30% share would be paid off the top of the
class's recovery. The remaining 70% of the recovery would be divided
among class members, including the lead plaintiff, in proportion to
their ownership of the issuer's shares. For example, if the winning
bidder held 10% of the issuer's stock and the class action settled for
$100 million, the lead plaintiff would receive $30 million for the auc-
tioned share plus $7 million for the 10% interest.' Netting out the
lead plaintiff's payment, the distribution per share to other class mem-
bers would be the same as it is when, under current arrangements,
class counsel receives a 30% fee and cost award. The cost of maximiz-
ing the recovery, including the lead plaintiff's bonus, is thus amortized
across the entire class.
The lead plaintiff's share of the class-wide recovery should be 30%
for two reasons. First, 30% is approximately the historical average for
fee and cost awards to lead plaintiffs and class counsel in securities
class actions. Therefore, using it assigns the lead plaintiff roughly the
same fraction of class-wide recoveries that has traditionally been used
to defray litigation costs. Second, given economies of scale in litiga-
tion services and spillover effects, it stands to reason that a lead plain-
tiff's efforts to maximize the 30% share would go a long way toward
maximizing the recovery for the entire class.
This auction approach has several advantages over existing arrange-
ments. First, as explained above, it eliminates the need for judges to
set fees or review the reasonableness of fees to which lead plaintiffs
agree. The PSLRA requires these reviews, but it gives judges no stan-
dards to apply. In particular, the PSLRA provides no guidance con-
cerning the circumstances in which judges should second-guess fees
promised by lead plaintiffs. The PSLRA thus creates uncertainty re-
garding the enforceability of lead plaintiffs' promises, which can only
weaken class counsel's incentives.
Presumably, lawyers would win some auctions for control of securi-
ties class actions-and they might win many. Class action lawyers are
litigation specialists. As such, they are better suited than many to
evaluate the profitability of class actions. They could also provide in-
house legal services, eliminating the principal-agent problems facing
nonlawyer lead plaintiffs. Finally, lawyers have recently developed
111. ($100 million - $30 million) * 10% = $7 million. This equation ignores the amount the
lead plaintiff bid to win the auction and any costs the lead plaintiff incurred while managing the
case, such as lost managerial time and time expended by lower level personnel responding to
discovery requests. The lead plaintiff's net recovery would be less than $37 million.
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significant abilities to raise litigation capital. Law firms that concen-
trate on serving as lead plaintiffs might even arise, just as specialized
class action law firms exist today.
The identity of the winning bidder notwithstanding, the incentives
to invest in litigation created by the auction would not be perfect.
Under the proposed arrangement, the lead plaintiff would receive at
most 30% of the marginal benefit from litigation outlays. The remain-
ing 70% would go to the class. Depending on the fee arrangement
with class counsel, the lead plaintiff's share of the return could actu-
ally be 0%. This would be true if the fee agreement entitled class
counsel to 100% of the lead plaintiff's share of any recovery within a
specified range. 1 2 Presumably, this incentive mismatch would cause
the lead plaintiff to underinvest relative to the optimal level for the
class.
Perfection is, however, an impossible goal. The underinvestment
problem described in the preceding paragraph afflicts all contingent
fee lawsuits-in all such cases, the plaintiff receives only a fraction of
the return on attorney effort and other investments in litigation. In
class actions today, for example, the named or lead plaintiff typically
has a minute interest in marginal dollars recovered. Class counsel's
interest is much larger, but is weakened by uncertainty about the size
of the fee award and by the tendency of judges to cut fee percentages
as recoveries rise.' 13 Given the deficiencies of current arrangements,
the question is not whether this proposal is perfect, but whether it
would likely be an improvement.
Several reasons support an affirmative answer. First and foremost,
lead plaintiffs and their lawyers would be free to address the incentive
mismatch contractually, taking advantage of their ingenuity and the
connection between the size of the bonus and the recovery for the
class. The mismatch is both well known and predictable. Innovative
fee arrangements can mitigate its effects. For example, increasing
marginal fee percentages could offset falling returns on litigation in-
vestments or declining economies of scale. Increasing percentages
would encourage class counsel to keep working despite falling returns
or rising costs. Declining marginal fee percentages could be used in
other situations, such as when expected returns depend less on litiga-
tion investments and more on matters beyond class counsel's control.
112. For example, a possible fee arrangement would entitle the lead plaintiff to the entire
bonus on the first $10 million recovered and class counsel to the entire bonus on the second $10
million recovered. The lead plaintiff's return from the second $10 million would be zero.
113. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorneys Fees in Class Action Settlements:
An Empirical Study. 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27 (2004).
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Although no single fee arrangement is likely to be best in all situa-
tions, the auctions proposed in this Section would motivate bidders to
find the arrangement best suited to their case.
Currently, the ingenuity lead plaintiffs and class counsel might use
to benefit all class members is lost. Lead plaintiffs gain too little from
optimal fee setting to invest significant resources. Lead plaintiffs also
share control of fees with judges who have neither an economic inter-
est in selecting optimal fee arrangements nor the data or savvy needed
to do so. In this context, one can therefore reasonably expect private
arrangements negotiated by interested and sophisticated people to
outperform regulations imposed from above.
Second, because lead plaintiffs would pay fees from their own pock-
ets, the auctions proposed in this Section would make it extremely
difficult for attorneys to use political contributions, lobbyists, or other
means to inflate their fees. Charging lead plaintiffs for class counsel
fees would completely externalize the problem of the lead plaintiff
favoring class counsel over the class. The proposed mechanism would
eliminate pressure on judges to cut fee requests, because all share-
holder classes would receive the same fixed percentage. Only the pay-
ment to the class from the winning bidder would vary across cases,
and the auction process would maximize it without judicial
interference.
Allowing lawyers to win lead plaintiff auctions might be troubling.
Opposition to lawyer-driven litigation in Congress led to the PSLRA,
yet the proposed auctions would sometimes put lawyers squarely in
charge of securities class actions. Many judges also have a policy
against lawyers serving as named plaintiffs and class counsel in the
same case. Finally, state bar rules prohibit lawyers from acquiring
proprietary interests in their clients' causes of action.
These considerations do not outweigh the benefits of this proposal.
All relate, in one way or another, to adequacy of representation. Con-
gress's concerns about lawyer-driven litigation reflected an underlying
belief that lawyers used securities fraud class actions to advance their
own interests at shareholders' expense. The auction proposal set out
in this Section ameliorates this concern by giving winning bidders-
here, lawyers-strong incentives to maximize class-wide recoveries
and by relieving absent class members of concerns about fees. The
doctrinal prohibition also reflects the concern that interest conflicts
make it improper for lawyers to serve as named plaintiffs and class
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counsel concurrently.'t 4 Under the auction proposal set out in this
Section, however, combining the roles of lead plaintiff and class coun-
sel limits the principal-agent problems that arise when these roles are
separated. Finally, state bar rules regulating case financing were not
written with class actions in mind. Courts should ignore these rules
when they conflict with the proper operation of class actions, as they
often do." 5
It is worth exploring the incentives of winning lawyer-bidders a bit
further. Today, attorneys' fees in the largest class actions may be as
low as 5% of the recovery and as high as 20% or more.1 6 This flat
rate approach may both overcompensate class counsel for recovering
"easy" dollars-dollars a defendant is willing to pay because of the
merits of a case-and undercompensate class counsel for recovering
"hard" dollars-dollars a defendant is willing to pay only because of
class counsel's superior effort. The auctions proposed in this Section
would address the overcompensation problem in the bidding process.
Expected overcompensation would be returned to the class via the
winning bidder's payment. Expected undercompensation would be
reduced by giving the winning lawyer-bidder a constant 30% interest
in all marginal dollars recovered. A winning lawyer-bidder would al-
ways be motivated to work hard for hard dollars, unlike today's class
counsel, whose economic stake in hard dollars may be small.
Auctions would also improve settlement bargaining. Currently,
bargaining often occurs in stages. Class counsel first negotiates a re-
covery for the class then negotiates a separate fund to cover attorneys'
fees." 7 In the first stage, class counsel's interests are conflicted. Hav-
ing some idea of the total amount the defendant is willing to pay, class
counsel's economic interest lies in directing the largest possible frac-
tion of that amount to the fee fund. The chief impediment to class
114. On lawyers serving as named plaintiffs and class counsel simultaneously, see ALBA
CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS AcTioNs § 3:40 (4th ed. 2002). "Most
courts have held that such a dual role is 'inherently fraught with potential conflicts of interest.'
Id. (quoting Graybeal v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 13 (D.D.C. 1973)).
115. See Charles Silver, Due Process and the Lodestar Method: You Can't Get There From
Here, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1809 (2000) (arguing that the due process imperative to minimize conflicts
between class counsel and absent class members requires judges to refrain from using the lode-
star method, even when state bar rules hold to the contrary).
116. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 113, at 75.
117. Inexplicably, the Manual for Complex Litigation recommends this approach. MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LiTIGATION, FOURTH § 21.7 (Stanley Marcus et al. eds., 2004). "[T]he simultane-
ous negotiation of class relief and attorney fees creates a potential conflict." Id. (citing In re
Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions. 148 F.3d 283, 334-35 (3d Cir.
1998)). "Separate negotiation of the class settlement before an agreement on fees is generally
preferable." Id.
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counsel's avarice is the fear that a judge will cut the fee or reject the
settlement if the ratio between the class fund and the fee fund is too
low. When negotiating, class counsel therefore targets the lowest re-
covery-to-fee ratio a trial judge will approve, rather than solely seek-
ing to help the class. In an effort to dispose of cases, judges may even
facilitate this corrupted bargaining process by signaling their views on
fees in advance.1 18
The negotiations just described contrast sharply with settlement
bargaining in standard contingent fee representations. When repre-
senting a client injured by an automobile accident or a medical mis-
take, the plaintiff's attorney simply bargains for the largest possible
recovery. The fee falls out automatically once this sum is obtained,
because the parties set it prior to negotiations in the client's retainer
agreement. The negotiations are still suboptimal, as they must be
when a bargaining agent receives less than 100% of the marginal dol-
lars, but the incentives are aligned and only differ in magnitude.
With the auction proposal in place, settlement bargaining in securi-
ties class actions would follow the conventional contingent fee model.
The parties' interests would be aligned, because the winning lawyer-
bidder's share of the recovery would be fixed at 30% in advance. Fees
would never be negotiated separately. As in conventional representa-
tions, settlement negotiations would focus solely on the defendant's
total payment.
Auctions would create a desirable feedback loop. By winning cases,
lawyers would obtain more money with which to bid on future cases
and develop reputations for success that would reduce their borrowing
costs. Unsuccessful lawyers would be forced out of the competition.
Law firms would enter the field, leave it, and expand and contract
based on their confidence, as well as their willingness and ability to
pay. This healthy market dynamic would make the securities plain-
tiffs' bar more effective and more profitable over time-though per-
haps less profitable than firms are today in the absence of this form of
competition. This would correct the current market failure, in which
the market does not fully determine which lawyer represents a class,
what class counsel is paid, or which law firms succeed.
VI. CONCLUSION
The PSLRA has failed to make private institutional investors active
participants in securities fraud class actions. Pension funds for public
118. While judges increase certainty by telling attorneys the maximums they will award, their
maximums may be too low to motivate hard dollar recovery or too high for easy dollar recovery.
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sector and union employees have often served as lead plaintiffs, and
their participation rates are increasing. Yet individual investors still
control many class actions. The motivations of public sector and
union pension funds may also be suspect. Political contributions from,
and lobbying efforts by, plaintiffs' law firms have raised questions
about these funds' independence and prompted others to challenge
their efforts to become lead plaintiffs.
These problems stem from the structure of the PSLRA, which is
deficient in many respects. Most importantly, the PSLRA lacks the
selective incentives needed to convince institutional investors of all
types that securities lawsuits are worth their time. The bonuses that
motivate individual investors to serve as lead plaintiffs mean nothing
to institutional investors. This explains the passivity of private institu-
tions and the importance of political contributions and ideology in the
realm of public and union funds.
Regulations on political contributions would be, at best, a half-step
in the right direction and, at worst, a sizeable step backwards. If suc-
cessful, these measures would remove the cloud that presently hangs
over public sector and union funds. But these measures would also
remove a reason these institutions have to step forward. By eliminat-
ing the selective incentives political contributions provide, they might
reduce the rate at which public sector and union funds volunteer as
lead plaintiffs, restoring the status quo that existed prior to the
PSLRA, in which individual investors led the vast majority of cases.
The PSLRA and restrictions on political contributions have a com-
mon failing: they will only succeed if stockholders are angels. If in-
vestors were inherently ethical, selfless, and good fiduciaries, they
would make excellent lead plaintiffs and would volunteer for the role
regardless of the incentives. But stockholders, especially institutions,
are not angels. They are hard-nosed participants in unforgiving mar-
kets who must seek to minimize costs and maximize profits. Given
this, it is unreasonable to expect a regulatory system that provides
weak participation incentives to lure institutional investors into securi-
ties class actions in large numbers.
Rather than indulge the fantasy that investors are angels, this Arti-
cle assumes that they are selfish, profit-motivated, and not above ethi-
cal lapses. A critic of rational actor models might say that this
assumes investors are devils who pursue the greater good only when
they can help themselves by doing so. These assumptions about inves-
tors' motivations lead to a simple conclusion: institutional investors
will become lead plaintiffs in larger numbers when selective incentives
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make it economically advantageous for them to volunteer. This Arti-
cle's proposals reflect that belief.
These proposals have many virtues, and the proposal to auction a
lead plaintiff share that includes the payment of fees is the most desir-
able. Each proposal requires a minimum of judicial involvement. The
simple lead plaintiff bonus approach requires almost none. Each pro-
posal is likely to give the investor with the largest stake in the out-
come both a significant incentive and a significant advantage. The
auction proposals would favor smaller investors only when they are
likely to litigate more successfully than larger ones. These proposals
would also give lead plaintiffs strong incentives to negotiate optimal
fee deals and protect absent class members from overpayment by
charging disproportionate shares of fees to lead plaintiffs and subject-
ing lead plaintiff bonuses to competitive market tests. Finally, fixing
the size of the lead plaintiff's share and class counsel's fee in advance
would create stronger incentives to invest in litigation and eliminate
the rivalry between the class and its representatives that exists when
the fees are discretionary. By giving control to the lead plaintiff,
whose willingness to pay demonstrates its potential to obtain the high-
est recovery, auctions would fulfill the promise of the PSLRA and
better serve investors.
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